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COMMENT
A REPUTATION TO UPHOLD: MARYLAND COURTS AND THE
CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF REIT LAW
SPENCER C. EBACH *
Just as Delaware is known for articles of incorporation, 1 Maryland is
known for Real Estate Investment Trusts 2 (“REIT” or, collectively,
“REITs”). 3 REITs are entities that own income producing properties—of
which eighty percent of the public-traded variation are based in Maryland4—
and they offer investors the ability to invest in tax-favored diversified
portfolios of real estate assets that provide returns historically competitive
with stock indices. 5 Critical to Delaware’s reputation, the Court of
Chancery—the State’s court of equity specializing in corporate litigation 6—
has provided a rich and detailed body of case law that has helped the state
bolster and maintain its status as the preferred state in which to incorporate

© 2021 Spencer C. Ebach
*J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author
wishes to thank all of his Maryland Law Review editors, particularly Daniel Mooney, Erin
Weinstock, Brandon Wharton, Alyssa Radovanovich, and Robyn Lessans for their thoughtful
feedback and guidance throughout the research and writing process, as well as Professors Michael
Van Alstine and William Moon for their knowledge and insight.
1. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Delaware’s Peril, 80 MD. L. REV. 59, 61 (2020) (explaining that
“Delaware accounts for the bulk of incorporations by publicly traded firms”); Christopher M.
Bruner, Leveraging Corporate Law: A Broader Account of Delaware’s Competition, 80 MD. L.
REV. 72, 74 (2020) (“[E]mpirical studies have concluded that Delaware faces little meaningful
competition among U.S. states when it comes to attracting incorporations . . . .”).
2. REITs are companies that own and often operate income-producing real estate or related
assets, including office buildings, shopping malls, apartments, hotels, resorts, self-storage facilities,
warehouses, and mortgage loans. They do not develop property for sale, but instead buy and
develop primarily to operate them as part of an investment portfolio. Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs),
INVESTOR.GOV,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investingbasics/investment-products/real-estate-investment-trusts-reits (last visited Apr. 24, 2021).
3. Natalie Sherman, For Some Businesses, Maryland is Actually Very Friendly, BALT. SUN
(Sept. 4, 2015, 6:30 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-reit-haven-20150904story.html.
4. James J. Hanks, Jr., Federally Tax-Qualified Real Estate Investment Trusts Formed Under
Maryland
Law,
NAREIT,
https://www.reit.com/sites/default/files/FederallyTaxQualifiedRealEstateInvestmentTrustsFormed
UnderMarylandLawbyJamesJHanksJr11-24-15.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2020).
5. What’s a REIT (Real Estate Investment Trust)?, NAREIT, https://www.reit.com/what-reit
(last visited Nov. 3, 2020).
6. See Kahan, supra note 1, at 63 (describing the Court of Chancery as a “de facto specialized
corporate court”).
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new businesses. 7 As the nation’s leader in REIT formation, Maryland plays
an essential role in the development of legal rules and standards for REIT
management and administration. Though the state’s reputation in the REIT
field is based in the state’s statutory law, to maintain that role and lead the
development and administration of REIT laws across the country, Maryland
needs a strong and experienced judicial mechanism. In the mold of
Delaware’s Court of Chancery, Maryland should sanction a REIT-specific
judicial body of expertise within the state’s court system. This judicial body
should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over REIT litigation to centralize the
state’s case law and influence for posterity. Though the procedures and
structure of such a judicial body may bear little resemblance to the world’s
foremost corporate-centric judiciary, the profound and long-lasting influence
the Court of Chancery has wielded in Delaware provides a blueprint that
Maryland should aspire to emulate.
I. BACKGROUND
Mirroring Delaware’s own corporate law history, Maryland’s place in
REIT law is based on a strong and attractive statutory scheme dictating the
rules and procedures for formation and operations. However, Maryland does
not have a judicial system comparable to Delaware’s. The Court of Chancery
has been Delaware’s primary judicial body for corporate legal disputes since
the state became an early adopter of general corporation statutes.8 Since the
passage of Title 8, Chapter 1 of the Delaware Code, the court has provided a
rich and detailed body of case law that has helped the state bolster and
maintain Delaware’s reputation as the preferred state in which to incorporate
new businesses. 9 Built on the foundation of an attractive incorporation
statute, the relationship between that statute and the state’s corresponding
case law has reinforced the importance of Delaware to the nation’s corporate
business structure. Section I.A will discuss the development and text of
Maryland’s statutory REIT laws. 10 Then, Section I.B will explore the

7. See supra note 1.
8. Delaware passed the General Corporation Law in 1899. S. Samuel Arsht, A History of
Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1976). Though not the first state to pass an
incorporation statute particularly friendly to corporate interests, Delaware stepped into place after
then-New Jersey Governor Woodrow Wilson took measures to severely limit the powers of trusts
and corporations under state law in 1913. Id. A number of factors likely contributed to Delaware’s
subsequent assent to its position as the home of incorporation, but New Jersey’s reforms cleared the
path for a state, especially one close to New York at the turn of the century, to pick up where it left
off. Id.; see also Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899,
1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 271 (1976) (describing the history and evolution of Delaware’s
incorporation statutes).
9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101–398 (2021).
10. See infra Section I.A.
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litigation of REIT cases in Maryland and the role different courts play in that
process. 11 Section I.C will discuss the Delaware Court of Chancery’s
reputation and influence in corporate law, particularly with respect to its
appeal for those businesses looking to incorporate. 12 Lastly, Section I.D will
describe notable Delaware Court of Chancery and Delaware Supreme Court
decisions and their significance on the corporate landscape. 13
A. Maryland’s REIT Law
Maryland’s REIT law originates in Title 8 of the Corporations and
Associations article of the Maryland Code. 14 Much like Delaware, the
attractive statutory provisions within Title 8 were a primary catalyst for
Maryland’s reputation as the state in which to form REITs. 15 These
provisions were adopted shortly after federal legislation was signed into law
by President Eisenhower sanctioning the formation of REITs to facilitate the
“widely dispersed public ownership of real estate in the United States.” 16
Most importantly, these new investment vehicles were created with the
intention that they would receive preferential tax treatment. 17 To this day,
REITs are still not required to pay corporate income tax as long as they
distribute at least ninety percent of their taxable income to shareholders.18
Maryland’s Title 8 itself expanded directly on the federal rules,
operationalized through the Internal Revenue Code, and three years later the
Maryland legislature enacted a statute “providing for a separate, freestanding vehicle at state law, known as a real estate investment trust, to take
advantage[] of the new REIT provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.” 19
At that moment, Maryland was on the cutting edge of REIT law, one of
the very first states to embrace the new investment vehicle, just as Delaware
was an early leader in developing a “liberal” incorporation statute that
attracted new businesses at the turn of the twentieth century. 20 The statute is
particularly attractive to new trusts because of the protections it provides for
investors. Title 8 codifies provisions validating the REIT share ownership
11. See infra Section I.B.
12. See infra Section I.C.
13. See infra Section I.D.
14. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 8-801 to 8-901 (West 2020).
15. Heather Harlan, REITs Find a Comfortable Home in Md., BALT. BUS. J. (Mar. 27, 2000,
12:00 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/stories/2000/03/27/story4.html.
16. James Hanks & Sharon Kroupa, Why Maryland is the Favored Jurisdiction for Forming
REITs, CSC GLOBAL (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.cscglobal.com/service/webinar/maryland-reitdominance/; 26 U.S.C. §§ 856–859.
17. Hanks & Kroupa, supra note 16.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Seligman, supra note 8, at 271.
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and transfer limitations outlined in the Code’s 5/50 Test. 21 One of the key
structural features of REITs, this test prohibits more than fifty percent of a
trust from being held by five or fewer individuals. 22 Title 8 further provides
REIT shareholders with broad liability protections, flexible voting
provisions, relaxed bylaw amendment provisions, easy stock issuance
procedures, and protections against hostile takeovers. 23
With respect to hostile takeovers, maneuvers activist investors often
deploy against the wishes of public companies’ management teams,
Maryland law “provide[s] some support for the use of an excess share
provision to deter a coercive bid.” 24 This type of provision is a particularly
fruitful benefit of the 5/50 test, wherein, “any shares acquired by a
shareholder in excess of the ownership threshold are stripped of excess voting
rights or any right to receive dividends until the excess shares are transferred
to a holder who can own them without violating the ownership restriction.” 25
Furthermore, Maryland’s “control share and fair price statutes and the
constituency provisions in the Maryland Unsolicited Takeover Act permit
directors . . . to consider the interests of the corporation’s shareholders,
employees, customers, creditors, suppliers and communities in which the
corporation is located or does business.” 26 The key point in these ownership
and equity transfer limitations is that they may be used to protect the tax
status of the REIT against takeovers, among other enumerated protections. 27
With the statutory codification of the 5/50 test, Maryland has put into law
specific protections against both hostile takeovers and proxy contests with
provisions making it particularly difficult to accumulate controlling
shareholder positions. 28 Just as Delaware’s status in incorporation is related
to its business-friendly statutory structure, Maryland’s REIT provisions
provide statutory language friendly to the interests of those forming REITs
for either residential or commercial purposes. 29

21. See 26 U.S.C. § 856(h) (stating that a real estate investment trust may not be closely held
in accordance with § 542(a)(2)’s requirement that at any time during the last half of the taxable year,
more than fifty percent of the entity’s outstanding stock cannot be owned by not more than five
individuals).
22. Hanks & Kroupa, supra note 16.
23. Harlan, supra note 15.
24. David M. Einhorn, Adam O. Emmerich, Robin Panovka, William Savitt & David B. Silva,
Hostile Takeovers of REITs 49 (Samuel Zell & Robert Lurie Real Est. Ctr., Working Paper No.
539).
25. Id. at 48.
26. Id. at 53.
27. Hanks & Kroupa, supra note 16.
28. Id.
29. See Jamie Smith Hopkins, Md. REIT Returns 329% in 5 Years, BALT. SUN (Jan. 8, 2004),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2004-01-08-0401080171-story.html
(noting
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B. REIT Litigation in Maryland Courts
Currently, Maryland lacks a court or judicial body with specific and sole
responsibility to hear REIT cases. The Maryland Court of Appeals, the
state’s highest court, considers many important and contentious legal issues,
but when hearing critical cases about REITs, the court’s judges do not have
the benefit of subject matter expertise. These proceedings often turn on
matters related to executive duties and protections for shareholders, such as
Oliveira v. Sugarman, 30 in which the court clarified the standard under the
business judgement rule applies when a disinterested and independent board
of directors decides to deny a shareholder litigation demand. 31 Maryland
courts maintain a high degree of deference to corporate board decisions in
shareholder disputes, an appealing feature of the state’s business law
environment to those forming new businesses. 32
In addition, the Maryland legislature organized the Maryland Circuit
Court Business and Technology Case Management Program, a small group
of judges at the circuit court level who receive special training to hear certain
business-related cases. 33 The program has heard a number of REIT-related
cases, litigating issues of board activity, 34 duties between parties, 35 and trust

Maryland-based REIT had “pulled off the highest five-year shareholder return among the nation’s
21 office real estate investment trusts.”).
30. 451 Md. 208, 152 A.3d 728 (2017).
31. Id. at 245, 152 A.3d at 751 (holding that when the board of directors of a REIT consists of
a majority of independent directors who make a decision regarding a transaction or who will appoint
a special litigation committee to that makes the decision, they do not have a duty to accept a
shareholder demand with regard to that transaction).
32. See Shenker v. Laureate Educ., Inc., 411 Md. 317, 349–50, 983 A.2d 408, 427 (2009)
(stating that when directors use defensive mechanisms to prevent hostile takeovers, there is no
higher duty or greater scrutiny than any other acts of directors because the legislative history
indicates an intention “to reject in Maryland the ‘heightened scrutiny’ imposed on directors of
Delaware corporations in hostile takeover situations by the Delaware Supreme Court . . . a relatively
rare rejection in Maryland of Delaware’s acknowledged leadership in . . . corporate law to which
we and many other states ordinarily look for guidance”); see also Boland v. Boland, 423 Md. 296,
336, 31 A.3d 529, 548 (2011) (quoting Shenker, 411 Md. at 344, 983 A.2d at 424) (stating that
Maryland’s default standard in analyzing corporate decisions “is the deferential business judgment
rule, which insulates ‘the business decisions made by the director from judicial review’”).
33. See infra Section II.C.
34. See In re Nationwide Health Props., No. 24-C-11-001476, 2011 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3, at
*15 (May 27, 2011) (providing further protections for boards of directors by differentiating the
application of state statutory law to “cash-out” transactions versus a “stock-for-stock” transaction
proposed by officers and directors); see also In re Aviv REIT Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 24-C-14006352, 2015 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 16, at *13–14 (Mar. 20, 2015) (citing the Nationwide court’s
holding as a persuasive basis for denying plaintiffs’ action against company directors “for breach
of [a] duty to maximize shareholder value”).
35. Corvex Mgmt. LP v. Commonwealth Reit, No. 24-C-13-001111, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS
3, at *27 (May 8, 2013) (clarifying the duties parties are bound to through REIT bylaws regarding
arbitration).
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mergers and sales. 36 Although no state court exercises exclusive jurisdiction
over REITs, decisions made across Maryland’s judiciary effect specific
provisions of the State’s REIT laws, directors, and shareholders incorporated
or seeking to incorporate in the state.
C. The Court of Chancery’s Structure and Influence
The Court of Chancery built a reputation so formidable that it now
serves as a leader on both the national and international stages, engaging in a
decades-long process of self-reinforcement that has created and maintained
its position in the corporate law world. Approximately sixty-five percent of
the Fortune 500, an annual list compiling the largest American companies by
revenue, 37 was incorporated in Delaware as of 2019. 38 Effectively the
nation’s corporate capital, “[f]or at least half a century the Delaware courts
have been the de facto ‘national’ U.S. corporate law courts.” 39 The Court of
Chancery’s “ability to provide a unique branded customer experience partly
explains its dominant performance within a high-end market segment
composed of large, publicly traded firms.” 40
The court had to build its own knowledge and institutional precedents,
especially given the desire to “quickly [take] over New Jersey’s throne” and
the incentive to maintain a “first-mover” advantage as the first and perhaps
most visible state to act, to adequately address problems across the spectrum
of corporate governance. 41 Otherwise, those large, publicly traded firms
would have turned elsewhere in search of assurance of protection in potential
litigation. Both in the United States and abroad, multinational corporations
present judiciaries with a range of challenging legal issues, including
corporate governance, mergers and acquisitions, financial procedures,
compliance, risk management, and other commercial and consumer-related
matters. Scholars argue that “[b]y routinely deciding these business disputes,
Delaware courts—through well-established precedents—influence domestic
and foreign courts as well as corporate stakeholders worldwide.” 42

36. Frederick v. Corcoran, No. 370685-V, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 5, at *16–17 (Aug. 14,
2013) (parsing the responsibilities of board members in approving and executing a REIT merger or
sale under Maryland law).
37. Methodology for Fortune 500, FORTUNE, https://fortune.com/franchise-list-page/fortune500-methodology-2020 (last visited Jan. 4, 2021).
38. DELAWARE DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS: 2019 ANNUAL REPORT STATISTICS (2020).
39. Omari Scott Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 220 (2015) (quoting
John Armour, Bernard S. Black & Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345,
1349 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
40. Id.
41. William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1412 (2020).
42. Simmons, supra note 39, at 222.
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Consider the following statement from Chief Justice Rehnquist,
delivered in Wilmington, Delaware at the bicentennial celebration for the
Court of Chancery:
Corporate lawyers across the United States have praised the
expertise of the Court of Chancery, noting that since the turn of the
century, it has handed down thousands of opinions interpreting
virtually every provision of Delaware’s corporate law statute. No
other state court can make such a claim. As one scholar has
observed, “[t]he economies of scale created by the high volume of
corporate litigation in Delaware contribute to an efficient and
expert court system and bar.” 43
The Court of Chancery has benefited immensely under the “internal
affairs doctrine,” a conflict of laws principle that “recognizes that only one
[s]tate should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs—
matters peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and
its current officers, directors, and shareholders—because otherwise a
corporation could be faced with conflicting demands.” 44 Many jurisdictions,
including Maryland, recognize the principles underlying the doctrine as
primary tools in keeping corporate law matters relegated to their originating
state. 45 Recent litigation patterns “have put pressure on this arrangement”
with corporate law more often litigated outside of Delaware as the state
maneuvers to avoid public pushback to rulings that may result in an
increasing pattern of federalization of corporate law.46 However, “[d]espite
changes in the underlying [internal affairs] doctrine, Delaware stakeholders
have continued to draw [a] connection between law and forum . . . and
commentators argue[] that Delaware successfully attracts incorporations both
because of the content of its corporate law and because of its expert,
specialized courts and judges.” 47
Thus, the high volume of corporate litigation in Delaware has proven to
be a demonstrably valuable resource in the legal field. Because of the State’s
prominence in corporate matters and its reliance on “corporate franchise fees,
which constitute approximately sixteen percent of its revenues,” 48 the State
has an incentive to ensure the quality of its incorporation code and the case
43. William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the StateFederal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (1992).
44. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).
45. See Wilkins v. Thorne, 60 Md. 253, 258 (1883) (“This corporation was created under the
laws of another State, and it seems to us that all such controversies must be determined by the Courts
of the State by which the corporation was created.”).
46. Verity Winship, Bargaining for Exclusive State Court Jurisdiction, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX
LITIG. 51, 57 (2012).
47. Id.
48. Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REV. 757, 842 (1995).
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law surrounding the field. This incentive exemplifies the idea behind the
“commitment theory,” whereby Delaware’s commitment to the maintenance
of a responsive corporate code is tied both to its own expenditures and the
confidence of the firms incorporated in the State. 49 Furthermore, from the
perspective of those firms reliant on the Court of Chancery in this respect,
the rich and evolving legal history in Delaware offers positive “network
effects,” including lower regulatory, information, and compliance costs with
the process of incorporation. 50 With so many issues having been previously
acknowledged and decided by the Court of Chancery, those looking to
incorporate a new business in Delaware have a foundational set of principles
and rules that provide a certainty akin to protections against legal action.
Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized this phenomenon and its potential results
in his bicentennial address:
Perhaps most importantly, practitioners recognize that “[o]utside
the takeover process . . . , most Delaware corporations do not find
themselves in litigation. The process of decision in the litigated
cases has so refined the law that business planners may usually
order their affairs to avoid lawsuits.” As one commentary
concluded, “[t]ime is the best test of an institution and, over time,
Delaware’s law has earned respect and emulation. Such success is
not dramatic, but the result of careful, conservative, long time
attention.” Judicial efficiency and expertise, a well-paid and wellrespected judiciary, innovative judicial administration, courageous
leadership—these hallmarks of the Delaware Court of Chancery
provide a fine example of a somewhat specialized state court
system in action. 51
That efficiency, expertise, and innovative judicial administration has
empowered the Delaware courts to lead by facilitating equitable outcomes
across the corporate spectrum. Judges, especially those on the Court of
Chancery, are highly specialized in corporate law and are faced with a “large
number of cases and write numerous opinions that provide a large body of
data on the meaning of Delaware’s law[,]” achieving what in “modern
academic parlance [] has been characterized as a network effect—a positive
externality produced by the large number of corporations incorporated in
Delaware and litigating in their courts.” 52 In addition, the Court of Chancery
sits without juries, so corporations incorporate in Delaware with the
49. Id. at 842–43 (citing ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW
14–24 (1993)).
50. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1069 (2000).
51. Rehnquist, supra note 43, at 354.
52. William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2009).
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knowledge that any legal disputes related to corporate matters that may arise
will be heard and decided by these experts in the field.53
Indeed, there are tremendous advantages to sharing among the already
large pool of Delaware corporations, as “[l]egal experience from one
Delaware corporation is readily transferable to another Delaware corporation
because they operate under a common set of rules.” 54 This transfer of
institutional knowledge reinforces over time, as “[t]he quality of future case
law depends on the number and diversity of lawsuits brought before the
courts. These factors, in turn, depend on the number of firms incorporated in
the state.” 55 As the home of such a rich and varied collection of corporate
entities, Delaware’s corporate law has thus become tremendously influential
far beyond its own borders, appealing to lawyers and executives looking to
do business worldwide.
D. Important Delaware Precedent
The Court of Chancery’s decisions have broad influence within the field
of corporate law. Because so many major corporations are incorporated in
Delaware, cases within both the Court of Chancery and the Delaware
Supreme Court apply to businesses with name-brand recognition across the
Global 2000. 56 For example, in Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG57 the Court
of Chancery found, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, the ability of
a buyer to terminate a merger based on a post-trial determination that a
material adverse effect occurred. 58 The holding, by virtue of Delaware’s role
as the home of incorporation for so many major companies, necessitates the
attention and careful consideration of parties negotiating merger agreements
or litigating over agreement provisions. Though the decision would appear
to indicate that “buyers will continue to bear an extremely heavy burden in
53. Fisch, supra note 50, at 1096.
54. David Porter, Competing with Delaware: Recent Amendments to Ohio’s Corporate
Statutes, 40 AKRON. L. REV. 175, 177 (2007).
55. Id. at 177–78 (Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition Over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 556 (2002)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
56. Forbes compiles its “Global 2000 list using data from FactSet Research systems to screen
for the biggest public companies [around the world] in four metrics: sales, profits, assets and market
value.” Andrea Murphy, Hank Tucker, Marley Coyne & Halah Touryalai, GLOBAL 2000: The
World’s Largest Public Companies, FORBES (May 13, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/global2000/#2f6bcddf335d.
57. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d No. 2018-0300-JTL,
2018 WL 6427137 (Del. Dec. 9, 2018).
58. In the case, German pharmaceutical company Fresenius Kabi had signed a merger
agreement to purchase the U.S. drug manufacturer Akorn, which was followed by a steep decline
in Akorn’s financial performance which Fresenius cited as a materially adverse effect as they
withdrew from the agreement. Akorn, Inc., 2018 WL 4719347, at *39.
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establishing a stand-alone [material adverse effect] to avoid their obligations
to close,” it raised a numbers of questions moving forward, including the
importance of a buyer’s access to information prior to the close of a
transaction. 59 A 2017 case, Shawe v. Elting, 60 exemplified a perhaps even
more dramatic holding by the Court of Chancery, wherein upon finding the
presence of a deadlock between shareholders and directors, the court
appointed a custodian to essentially force a sale of TransPerfect Global, a
massively profitable corporation, to a third party. 61 For those involved in
proxy contests, shareholder activism, and even retail investing, this case
represented an uncommon and drastic judicial remedy for corporate disputes.
Prior decisions from the Delaware Supreme Court illustrate the depth
and relevance of the state’s judicial rulings in shaping corporate law and
practices within the United States. In Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 62 the court held, in a landmark decision, that when a company is
up for sale, the board of directors has a duty to maximize the value of that
sale for shareholders’ benefit, changing the scope of directors’ fiduciary
duties and their approach to their company’s position before the sale occurs.63
The ramifications of a decision of this magnitude can be long-lasting, with
directors’ duties heightened in the course of corporate transactions involving
Delaware corporations and a subsequent judicial history determining when the
new doctrine will apply. 64 The Delaware Supreme Court continues to hear and
rule on consequential cases, such as KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir
Technologies Inc., 65 where the court clarified the duty of a company to
produce emails among its management to stockholders, reiterating the
importance of maintaining formal corporate records for board-level actions. 66
As Delaware’s corporate law continues to reign influentially both in the
United States and abroad, the courts will play a central role in the

59. Douglas N. Cogen, Ken S. Myers, & Stephen M. Fisher, Akorn v. Fresenius: Important
Practical Lessons from First-Ever Material Adverse Effect, FENWICK (Oct. 24, 2018),
https://www.fenwick.com/insights/publications/akorn-v-fresenius-important-practical-lessonsfrom-first-ever-material-adverse-effect.
60. 157 A.3d 152 (Del. 2017).
61. Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 167 (Del. 2017).
62. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
63. Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
64. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring Developing
Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323, 331 (2018).
65. 203 A.3d 738 (Del. 2019).
66. KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs Inc., 203 A.3d 738, 758 (Del. 2019) (addressing a
demand by a stockholder for corporate books and records, including emails and electronicallystored information (“ESI”) among management, to allow the stockholder to investigate possible
wrongdoing, such as the reasons behind amendments to an Investors’ Rights Agreement that
severely reduced the original rights granted under that agreement).
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development of rules and standards pertinent to matters relevant to both
directors and shareholders of corporations.
II. ANALYSIS
As the nation’s leader in REIT formation, Maryland plays an essential
role in the development of legal rules and standards for REIT management
and administration. Looking to Delaware, where the relationship between
the State’s statutory and case law on corporate matters has reinforced the
importance of the State to the nation’s corporate business structure, Maryland
has an ideal example to follow. As the home of a majority of the publiclytraded REITs in the United States, Maryland has an opportunity to lead the
development and administration of REIT laws across the country by
implementing a strong and experienced judicial mechanism. The creation of
a REIT-specific judicial body of expertise within Maryland’s court system
with exclusive jurisdiction over REIT litigation—in the spirit of Delaware’s
Court of Chancery—can serve as a vehicle for effective REIT administration.
Section II.A will describe the benefits of modeling a new judicial body after
the Court of Chancery. 67 Then, Section II.B will describe how such a body
would be formed within the State of Maryland, highlighting specific
questions lawmakers should focus on. 68 Lastly, Section II.C will discuss the
logistics and functionality of developing a REIT-focused judicial body in
Maryland through the lens of the currently implemented Business and
Technology Case Management Program. 69
A. The Benefits of Modelling Delaware’s Court of Chancery
Maryland’s judiciary, state legislators, and practicing attorneys have a
vested interest in the continued success of the State’s REIT law
administration. The development of a legal structure for REIT law
procedures and evaluation—in the spirit of Delaware’s continued selfenforcing success in the corporate field—is critical to Maryland’s long-term
status as a preferential state in which to form trusts. 70 The beneficial
consequences of the procedures and principles that underly the first-mover
advantage, internal affairs doctrine, commitment theory, and the
corresponding network effects of all three would provide forward-looking
momentum and support for Maryland’s legal infrastructure. The Maryland
General Assembly has maintained an interest in the benefits that a pro-

67.
68.
69.
70.

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
See supra Section I.C.
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business environment provides, 71 and the favorable, user-friendly REIT
statutes in place have facilitated positive revenue outcomes for the state.
Though Maryland, unlike Delaware, does not charge a franchise tax for
businesses, 72 the state does charge fees for filing articles of incorporation and
other documents pertinent to corporate matters.73 Furthermore, a strong
reputation in REIT law already provides some support and opportunities for
Maryland’s legal field, just as Delaware’s status in corporate law, due to the
Court of Chancery’s role, has bolstered the State’s legal profession. 74
Delaware and Maryland law differ in important respects to those
evaluating opportunities to incorporate. 75 However, the internal machinery
and posturing of the states’ judicial systems appear to suggest parallel
structural mandates. Just as the Court of Chancery benefits from an
experienced and knowledgeable bench, the Maryland General Assembly has
placed an emphasis on crafting a “[g]reater efficiency resulting from the
specialized training and education of judges, clerks, and staff,” seeking to
deploy modern technologies to streamline the filing and processing of
cases. 76 This efficiency and expertise within Maryland’s courts would lead
to “[m]ore timely, rational, legally correct, and . . . predictable rulings from
judges who are better trained[,] educated[,] . . . and comfortable in handling
these cases.” 77 In analyzing business-focused courts across the country,
commentators note that practitioners emphasize that a “consistency regarding
judges hearing . . . cases as well as their business sophistication has created
trust in the system, which they cite as a crucial element to the success of a
specialized court system.” 78 Without a specialized judicial body, Maryland

71. See infra Section II.C.
72. Hanks & Kroupa, supra note 16.
73. See STATE DEPARTMENT OF ASSESSMENTS AND TAXATION, FEE SCHEDULE FOR
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO CORPORATE CHARTERS (2020) (detailing fees for corporate filings in
the state of Maryland).
74. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 472 (1987) (describing how “the rules that Delaware supplies
often can be viewed as attempts to maximize revenues to the bar, and more particularly to an elite
cadre of Wilmington lawyers who practice corporate law in the state”).
75. See Jason E. Dunn, Yaacov M. Gross & Kenneth E. Sicklick, What’s Market? Update:
Maryland
REIT,
GOULSTON
&
STORRS
(Oct.
2015),
https://www.goulstonstorrs.com/publications/whats-market-update-maryland-reit/ (stating that
“acts of directors of Maryland corporations relating to acquisitions or potential acquisitions of
control of such corporations are not subject to higher duties or greater scrutiny than any other acts
of such directors[,]” which cuts against the established Delaware precedent under Revlon requiring
greater scrutiny and directors’ duties under certain circumstances).
76. MARYLAND BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE, MARYLAND BUSINESS AND
TECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE REPORT 6 (2000).
77. Id.
78. AMELIA PARSONS & BRETT BURKA, REPORT ON BUSINESS COURTS, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS, AND RELATED ISSUES COURTS 25 (2015).
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is not in a position to consolidate its influence on REIT law and wield a
judicial authority akin to the Court of Chancery’s. 79 Furthermore, the
consistently present threat of arbitration and forum selection clauses applied
in REIT litigation may come to inhibit Maryland’s ability to set standards in
the field if the state was to lose its reputation as the premier jurisdiction for
REIT incorporation and public policy. 80 Contractual provisions precluding
questions of REIT law from being litigated in Maryland would undercut the
state’s vitality to the industry, and a strong, REIT-focused judicial body
would serve to aid in the prevention of such a situation occurring.
B. Developing a REIT-Focused Judicial Body in Maryland
Developing a new, REIT-centric judicial body in Maryland would not
require a process foreign to state lawmakers. In 2000, the 421st Maryland
General Assembly passed House Bill 15, kicking off the process that
eventually led to the creation and implementation of the Maryland Circuit
Court Business and Technology Case Management Program with the
creation of an investigatory task force.81 The program, born out of a
perception that the state had become anti-business, began operation by late
2002, suggesting a relatively short lag-time in the creation of a new judicial
program. 82 The task force first heard testimony from business people, judges,
lawyers, legislators, and representatives of business courts established in
other states. And, though there was not a clear consensus on the specifics of
implementation, it “determined that there exist[ed] a general consensus that
if rules making Maryland’s courts more efficient and effective [could] be
drafted, such rules should be adopted.” 83
Critically, the task force emphasized “that the inefficiencies and the
reductions in the timeliness and quality of judicial decisionmaking . . . inevitably result[ing] from advocates with specialized knowledge
presenting cases to generalist trial judges . . . will grow to a level which is
intolerable.” 84 Consequently, the task force recommended “[s]pecialized
training and education for those judges with experience in business and
technology issues, as well as the application of specialized case management
techniques and technology for the handling of . . . cases.” 85
79. See infra Section II.C.
80. See generally Jennifer L. Permesly & Stephanie Sado, Shareholder Litigation and Forum
Selection Provisions, 33 NYSBA INSIDE 25, 26 (2015) (noting the growing importance of
mandatory arbitration provision enforcement in the context of shareholder disputes).
81. H.B. 15, 414th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2000).
82. Judyth Pendell, Maryland’s Ground-Breaking Technology Court, 5 CASE POINT 1, 12
(2006).
83. MARYLAND BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 5.
84. Id. at 7.
85. Id. at 6.
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C. The Business and Technology Case Management Program
A relatively new, statutorily sanctioned judicial body for REIT law and
administration has the potential to be particularly fruitful to the maintenance
of Maryland’s reputation. But a still-open question is whether Maryland’s
Circuit Court Business and Technology Case Management Program fits this
proposed model. 86 In the early 2000s, the General Assembly observed other
states moving towards specialized business courts that improved efficiency
and addressed perceptions that business-related cases were unsatisfactorily
handled. 87 They prioritized the creation of a business and technology
programing in an effort to overcome the perception that Maryland was antibusiness and to encourage technology companies to form and remain in the
state. 88 The task force honed in on the robust growth of cutting-edge
technologies as making up a vital part of Maryland’s economy, and
recognized that the potential of a technology court “to specialize in the
administration of disputes involving complex technology issues.” 89 The task
force ultimately recommended the implementation of a statewide business
and technology case management program within the existing circuit court
system, as opposed to the creation of a separate business and technology
body. 90
The existing Business and Technology Case Management Program
presents logistical and procedural challenges to its being the state’s REITfocused judicial body. Maryland law does not narrowly dictate the type of
case that falls within the program’s purview, and the assigning judge is
instead tasked to determine whether an action presents “commercial or
technological issues of such a complex or novel nature that specialized
treatment is likely to improve the administration of justice.”91 The law
includes a seven-factor list designed to measure a case in determining its

86. See supra Section II.B.
87. Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation and Jurisdiction of Business
Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAW. 147, 191 (2004).
88. Maryland’s General Assembly created and mandated a Maryland business and technology
task force “to consider the feasibility of establishing a specialized court function within Maryland’s
circuit courts to adjudicate business and technology disputes” and included in its makeup members
of the state’s judiciary, legislature, bar association, business community, and academic community.
Id. at 190-91 (quoting MARYLAND BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE, MARYLAND
BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE REPORT 1 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 191 (quoting Judge Steven I. Platt, Vice Chairman, Business and Technology Task
Force, Remarks on Business and Technology Court Task Force, at 5 (Nov. 16, 2000)).
90. MARYLAND BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE, supra note 76, at 7 (“[For] the
same reason it was not practical to establish Family Divisions in all of the circuit courts of this State
(i.e., those circuit courts having less than seven (7) judges), it would not be practical to establish
‘Business and Technology Divisions’ in those same courts.”).
91. MD. R. 16-308(c).
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suitability for inclusion in the program. 92 In addition, the Maryland State Bar
Association has noted that the program’s efficacy has been hampered by
issues including the non-uniformity in the program as administered in the
various circuits, the inconsistency in forms and case management procedures,
and a lack of coordination of, and accessibility to, information, opinions and
resources. 93
The case management program has taken measures to provide
transparency and promote its role in Maryland’s business law landscape,
listing information and resources on its website. 94 There is a “consensus
among interviewed Judges that there should be required training for new
[business and technology] judges and then a secondary training piece
consisting of [the] collaboration of all [business and technology] judges on
an ongoing basis.” 95 However, in building a judicial body with the intention
of maintaining and growing Maryland’s reputation as the home of REIT
formation, the current Business and Technology Case Management Program
best serves as a reference point. Its development provides a ready example
for the deployment of a new, free-standing REIT program, perhaps modeled
after the existing program itself. The benefits from the Court of Chancery’s
status in the world of corporate law suggest that Maryland needs a REITfocused body. 96 Whether through a separate court or a REIT-specific case
management program integrated into the judiciary, Maryland’s rich statutory
scheme and case law warrant an apparatus that carries the Maryland REIT
law brand.

92. Factors that the judge may consider in making the determination include: (1) the nature of
the relief sought, (2) the number and diverse interests of the parties, (3) the anticipated nature and
extent of pretrial discovery and motions, (4) whether the parties agree to waive venue if assignment
of the action to the program makes that necessary, (5) the degree of novelty and complexity of the
factual, legal, or evidentiary issues presented, (6) whether business or technology issues
predominate over other issues presented in the action, and (7) the willingness of the parties to
participate in alternative dispute resolution procedures. Id.
93. MSBA BUSINESS LAW SECTION AD HOC TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT AND PROPOSED
RECOMMENDATIONS: BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY CASE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM 1 (2017).
94. Maryland Business & Technology Case Management Program, MARYLAND COURTS,
https://www.courts.state.md.us/businesstech (last visited Dec. 9, 2020).
95. MSBA-UB BUSINESS LAW CLERKSHIP FELLOWS, THE MARYLAND BUSINESS AND
TECHNOLOGY CASE MANAGEMENT PROGRAM: EVOLUTION AND CURRENT FUNCTIONING 23
(2016),
https://cdn.laruta.io/app/uploads/sites/7/legacyFiles/uploadedFiles/MSBA/Member_Groups/Sectio
ns/Business_Law/Evolution%20and%20Current%20Functioning%20Report%20By%20the%20M
SBA-UB%20Business%20Law%20Clerkship%20Fellows.pdf.
96. See supra Section I.C.

88

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[VOL. 80:73

III. CONCLUSION
The development of a REIT-specific judicial body of expertise within
the Maryland court system, in the mold of Delaware’s Court of Chancery,
would bolster the state’s reputation and ability to shape this niche area of law.
The benefits to Maryland in developing such a judicial body after the Court
of Chancery are evident through Delaware’s own success and influence in
the legal world. 97 Furthermore, the formation of a new judicial machine is
not novel to the state and would not necessitate deviation from standard
practices. 98 Though the Business and Technology Case Management
Program offers a shining example of the General Assembly’s powers and
ability to facilitate effective judicial expediency and expertise, it alone does
not provide the adequate judicial infrastructure necessary. 99

97. See supra Section II.A.
98. See supra Section II.B.
99. See supra Section II.C.

